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Abstract—The paper provides a discussion of diverse delays
occurring in technology development, and an explanation of
reasons why, when seen holistically from outside, the process
of technology development might appear as an autonomous,
self-determining, uncontrollable process. When seen from in-
side, however, the process is far from being uncontrollable.
This paradox is explained by the fact that technology develop-
ment contains many processes with delays, in total amounting
sometimes to fifty years; when seen from outside, such a pro-
cess might appear uncontrollable, even if it is very much con-
trollable when approached internally and in detail. Therefore,
the definition and types of technology creation as well as stages
of technological processes are discussed in some detail in this
paper. Some aspects of the contemporary informational revo-
lution and some recent results on micro-theories of knowledge
and technology creation are also reviewed. It is suggested that
one of possible ways of changing the paradigmatic attitude of
philosophy of technology is to invite some such philosophers to
participate in the development of modern tools of knowledge
civilization era, such as software development and evaluation.
The conclusions of the paper stress the need of essentially new
approaches to many issues in the time of informational revo-
lution.
Keywords— autonomy, change of episteme, delay time, deter-
minism and controllability of technology, impacts of informa-
tional revolution, paradigm of philosophy of technology, tech-
nology development and evaluation.
1. Introduction
Seemingly and actually, software development and evalua-
tion is very distant from philosophy of technology. Soft-
ware development and evaluation is detailed, specific, mo-
tivated by the goal of producing best, reliable and user-
friendly software, applies specific staged development and
evaluation processes as well as software quality criteria;
it requires deep specialized knowledge about software en-
gineering, and is future-oriented, concentrates ex ante on
new products. Philosophy of technology is general, sees
technology as a socio-economic system of producing and
utilizing products of technology; sometimes accuses this
system of being autonomous or deterministic – that is, de-
veloping according to its inner momentum, without taking
into account humanistic values; often accuses this system
of being unethical – underestimating technological risks; is
historically oriented, concentrates on ex post evaluation of
results of technological development.
Yet this does not mean that the visible gap between software
evaluation and philosophy of technology is justified; nor
that it is desirable. Software development will (or already
has) become the decisive factor in the development of tech-
nology; also, it contributes to technological risks. With-
out including aspects of philosophy of technology, soft-
ware evaluation is liable to be accused of technological,
instrumental and functional rationality1; more seriously
speaking, inputs from philosophy of technology might en-
rich software development and evaluation. On the other
hand, without participating in software development, par-
ticularly in software evaluation, in times of information rev-
olution, philosophy of technology runs the risk of becom-
ing outdated and sterile. The conclusion is that both sides
might gain by bridging the gap. However, we shall see that
the initiative must come from software engineering side,
simply because philosophy of technology is too paradig-
matic – and I am telling this both as a technologist,
since fifty years specializing in computer simulation and
diverse related aspects of information technology, and
a specialist working in recent years close to philosophy,
on the new micro-theories of knowledge and technology
creation.
This too paradigmatic attitude of philosophy of technology
can be best illustrated by the opinion of Val Dusek [1],
a leading humanist philosopher of technology, who even
today denies the concept of informational revolution and
calls all the discussion of the change of civilization era,
of postindustrial, postcapitalist, informational or networked
society a technocratic hype and technological determinism.
On the other hand, as shown, e.g., in [2], the evidence of
tremendous social and economic changes already occurring
due to the impact of computing and network technology
is obvious. We might add here that the automation and
robotization of manufacturing already resulted in advanced
countries in an essential dematerialization of work which
contributed to the de-legitimization of the Marxian con-
cept of the leading role of proletariat and thus to the fall
of communist system. Thus, positions denying the change
observed today correspond to closing eyes when spotting
unpleasant objects. It might be related to an intuitive, un-
pleasant perception that if the thesis about an informational
1I just quote here typical phrases of philosophy of technology, even if
I disagree with their meaning and use – because personally I see technology
as the art of creating tools, in a broad sense including software, and refuse
to accept the reduction of creative technological rationality to instrumental
and functional aspects.
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revolution leading to a new era is valid, then the classical
philosophy of technology does not have a chance: it must
address quite new themes and must ask technologists about
advice, while it succeeded until now to concentrate on the
criticism of the old industrial society and develop practi-
cally without any feedback from engineers.
Thus, the motivation of this paper is to outline a list of new
topics of philosophy of technology, important in the times
of informational revolution and the beginnings of a new
era. We should start, however, with a criticism of a myth
of old philosophy of technology, concerning the assumed
(arbitrarily and intuitively, thus deeper than paradigmati-
cally – actually, in the hermeneutical horizon2 of old phi-
losophy of technology) autonomy and determinism of tech-
nology.
2. The Reasons of Seeing Technology as
an Autonomous, Deterministic System
We should recall first that the old philosophy of technology
understands its object, the concept of technology, in diverse
meanings (often without specifying the meaning used in
a given discourse), but most often as the socio-economic
system of creating and utilizing products of technology or
technological artefacts approached holistically, while tech-
nologists tend to understand their field more narrowly, as
the art of creating tools and technological artefacts. How-
ever, we shall discuss these distinctions in more detail later,
here we concentrate on the properties of the socio-economic
technological system. This system was often seen by the old
philosophy of technology as autonomous, i.e., uncontrol-
lable in technical terms, and deterministic, in at least two
senses: self-determining (which is similar to autonomous)
or determining the development of society. The latter is an
obvious error when seen by a technologist who knows well
that technology proposes and society chooses, although his-
torically we can list such technological developments (Jo-
hann Gutenberg, James Watt, personal computers and com-
puter networks) that enabled great economic, social and
cultural changes; thus, technology does not determine, only
enables social changes. The issue of self-determination
and autonomy or uncontrollability of technology is more
complicated, however.
The socio-economic system of creating and utilizing prod-
ucts of technology is complex. By approaching it holisti-
cally, without analyzing in detail its parts and their rela-
tions, the impression that this system is autonomous and
self-determining is very likely to emerge. The most impor-
tant reason for that impression might be the fact – over-
looked by most philosophy of technology – that this system
2By a hermeneutical horizon, as specified more precisely in [3] though
used earlier in diverse writings of hermeneutical philosophy, we under-
stand an intuitively assumed system of beliefs in the truth of basic axioms.
A hermeneutical horizon is usually not expressed explicitly, but can be
reconstructed, i.e., inferred from diverse clues. A hermeneutical horizon
is thus an intuitive, deep foundation of a paradigm.
includes many delays. By delay we understand the time
interval between starting an activity and observing its’ re-
sults; obviously, in the development of technology we can
observe at least the delay between starting a design and
finishing it, including initial testing and evaluation. How-
ever, this delay is relatively small when compared to other
delays in the processes of social acceptance and market pen-
etration of products of technology. At the very beginning,
new technological ideas appear often in academic commu-
nities; the character of knowledge creation in these commu-
nities is different than in industrial research organizations,
see [4], [5] and Section 4 of this paper; this makes difficult
the transfer of ideas from academia to industry and induces
additional delays.
Even if a product is ready for market penetration, con-
sumers initially distrust new products; it needs time to de-
velop social demand. Moreover, oligopolistic firms on high
technology markets delay acceptance of new standards, try-
ing to preserve this way their markets shares; this is another
reason of delays. These diverse socio-economic reasons in-
crease the total delay between an original idea and its broad
socio-economic use. In the case of mobile cell telephony
this delay amounted to ﬁfty years (the principle was devel-
oped for military purposes during the Second World War
in the forties, broad social use occurred in the nineties of
the 20th century). In the case of transistors and integrated
circuits the delay was shorter, because of their importance
in the time of cold war; but in the case of digital television
the delay again exceeds fifty years. For other examples of
such delays, see [6].
Now, a system with delays, if approached holistically
from outside, very likely appears as autonomous and self-
determining; we seem to have lost control over its func-
tioning. This is very well known to specialists in control
of systems with delays3, but might require a more detailed
explanation for non-specialists. Delay is a concept from
systems dynamics, better known to technological systems
dynamics studying systems with both inertial and pure de-
lays than to sociological systems dynamics that by delays
understands mostly inertial delays. By inertial delay we
mean delay occurring as a result of accumulation processes,
such as filling a glass with water; you can try to control
it by increasing the volume of the stream of water. By
pure delay we mean delay due to transportation, such as
the delay occurring when you wait on an airport at a lug-
gage conveyor, say, the delay between your luggage ap-
pearing on the conveyor and its’ coming to the place where
you wait for it. If you cannot move towards your luggage,
you obviously lose control over it until it comes to your
place.
Thus, when approaching from outside a socio-economic
system with delays coming to fifty years, you certainly per-
ceive a loss of control over the system. But how to ef-
3Such as myself: long ago, I have worked intensively on industrial con-
trol of processes with delays and published in 1970 a paper on the max-
imum principle (a necessary condition of optimality of dynamic control)
for systems with non-trivial pure delays in control, see [7].
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fectively control systems with delays? There are several
ways known to specialists; all of them, however, reduce to
trying to anticipate its behavior, or at least measure or ac-
quire information about this behavior with less delay than
in the end effect. In the example with airport luggage con-
veyor, this amounts to choosing such a place that you can
observe your luggage from the moment of its appearance
on the conveyor and react appropriately when it falls down
from the belt, or is taken by mistake by another passenger.
How to use this analogy for controlling the development of
technology? We must simply abandon the holistic, outside
approach, analyze the details of the development and see in
which points, at what stages of the process we can obtain
anticipating information.
Therefore, we must simply abandon the position originated
by a classical author of philosophy of technology, Jacques
Ellul [8], limiting his interests to collective processes in
the society that must be approached holistically, and fol-
lowed – for diverse reasons – by most philosophers of tech-
nology. For example, Carl Mitcham [9, p. 65] argues that
humanist philosophers, dominating philosophy of technol-
ogy4, simply cannot learn the details of technology, be-
cause “becoming mired in the specialized details of tech-
nology and its many processes tends to obscure relation-
ships to nontechnological aspects of the human”. However,
the main point of this paper is that we have here a bi-
nary, either-or choice: either philosophers of technology
continue to abstain from going into details of the process
of technology creation, thus they will continue to see tech-
nology as a dark, uncontrollable force; or they will try to
cooperate in effective control of technology, but then they
must learn details. Such learning of details starts with the
definition of technology and stages of technological pro-
cesses.
3. What Is Technology and Stages
of Technology Creation and Utilization
We can start by asking the question: what is technology?
There are diverse answers to this question. Technology
might be:
• for a philosopher of technology: the socio-economic
system of creating and utilizing technology;
• for a postmodern humanist scientist: an autonomous
force enslaving humanity;
• for an economist: a way of doing things, a technical
process;
• in common language: a technical artefact;
• for a natural scientist: an application of scientiﬁc
theories;
4Philosophers of mathematics are almost all – with a few exceptions –
mathematicians; philosophers of technology are almost all – with even
fewer exceptions – humanists or sociologists, not technologists.
• for a technologist: the art of constructing tools, an
inherent faculty of humanity, motivated by the joy of
creation:
– liberating people from hard work;
– helping technology brokers (venture capitalists,
bankers, managers) to make money – and if any
effect of that is enslaving, the brokers are re-
sponsible;
– stimulating the development of hard science by
inventions which give it new principles to de-
velop new concepts.
If there are that many answers, this means that the word
technology is commonly used imprecisely, such as in com-
mon language it often means a technological artefact, while
I rather use the term product of technology to denote this
meaning. Being a technologist, I believe that our, tech-
nological understanding is most close to the essence5 of
the meaning of the word technology; however, since others
might contend this interpretation (and Dusek [1] does not
even list it in his discussion of definitions of technology),
I agree to designate it technology proper. Moreover, it is
very close to one of interpretations of the word technol-
ogy by Martin Heidegger [10] – even if he used several
such interpretations, selecting a convenient interpretation
for a given discourse – as well as to the classical Greek
word techne. In [11] and [12] the following definition was
proposed:
Technology proper is a basic human faculty that concen-
trates on the creation of tools and artefacts needed for
humanity in dealing with nature. It presupposes some hu-
man intervention in nature, but can also serve the goal
of limiting such intervention to the necessary scale. It is
essentially a truth-revealing, creative activity, thus it is sim-
ilar to arts. It is also, for the most part, a problem-solving
activity, concentrating on solving practical problems.
Philosophy of technology often says that the old concept
of techne was changed by modern mass production, but
this is mixing technology proper with mass production
technological processes that constitute another stage of the
socio-economic system of technology creation and utiliza-
tion. Techne, technology proper, remains essentially the
same: a truth-revealing, creative activity of constructing
tools – naturally, tools characteristic for a given civilization
era; we can speak thus about techne1 in ancient Greece,
techne2 in the times of constructing telescopes and me-
chanical clocks, techne3 in the era of industrial civilization,
techne4 in times of informational revolution and knowledge
civilization, when the main tools constructed are software
tools.
Now we should outline shortly – see [5] for a more detailed
discussion – the relations of technology proper to hard sci-
ence (natural sciences and mathematics) and to soft science
(social sciences and humanities), as well as to the system
5With all reservations concerning the possibility or rather impossibility
of reaching the true essence of meanings.
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of socio-economic applications of technology. They are
outlined by the second part of the definition:
Thus, technology proper uses the results of basic sciences,
if they are available; if they are not, technology proposes its
own solutions, often promoting in this way quite new con-
cepts, which are assimilated after some delay by the hard
or social sciences. It is not an autonomous force, because it
depends on all other human activities and inﬂuences them
in return. It is, however, sovereign, in the same sense as
arts are sovereign human activities. Autonomous forces can
be found in the socio-economic system of applications of
technology proper.
How, then, do the hard, basic sciences and technology de-
pend on each other? As in many questions of human devel-
opment, they influence each other through a positive feed-
back loop, see Fig. 1; technological development stimulates
basic science, while scientific theories are applied techno-
logically.
Fig. 1. Two positive feedback loops.
Recall that feedback – the circular impact of the time-
stream of results of an action on its causes – was used by
James Watt in a negative feedback loop and reinvented by
Harold Black [13]6. Feedback can be of two types: positive
feedback when the results circularly support their causes,
which results in fast development, like a growing avalanche,
and negative feedback when the results circularly counter-
act their causes, which leads to the positive effect of sta-
bilisation (for example, the stabilisation of human body
temperature is based on negative feedback). The concept
of feedback essentially changed our understanding of the
cause and effect relationship, resolving paradoxes of circu-
lar arguments in logic (when they concern causal reason-
ing), though it must be understood that such paradoxes can
be resolved only by dynamic, not static causal reasoning
or models. An example of such paradox is the argument
6Black actually patented this concept in 1928, published a paper on it
in 1934.
of Bruno Latour [14] against objectivity, saying that since
the concept of nature is the outcome of our construction
of knowledge, it cannot be at the same time its cause –
a clear example of a deep misunderstanding of the essen-
tially dynamic, evolutionary character of the causal positive
feedback loop in this case.
But the positive feedback loop between technology and sci-
ence works slowly: technological stimulations are analyzed
by science with much delay, and technology also does not
reply instantly to new scientific theories.
The second positive feedback loop is between technol-
ogy and the systems of its socio-economic applications.
The distinction between technology proper and its socio-
economic applications should be obvious for at least two
reasons. The first is that technologists often work on a tech-
nological problem for quite a long time (e.g., almost fifty
years in the case of digital television) before their results
are broadly socially applied. The second is simple: tech-
nologists do not make much money, technology brokers
(entrepreneurs, managers, bankers, etc.) do, just as art bro-
kers make more money than artists. If a technological prod-
uct or service, such as mobile telephony, produces much
revenue, then more money is available for its further tech-
nological development; this leads to the truly avalanche-like
processes of the social adoption of technological hits.
These processes have strange dynamic properties, socio-
economic acceptance of novelties is slow, and there is usu-
ally a long delay time between the recognition of a purely
technological possibility and the start of an avalanche of its
broad socio-economic applications. This delay has many
causes which we already discussed, e.g., after initial social
distrust, some time must pass before that distrust turns into
a blind social fascination once a technological hit becomes
fashionable. Once it starts to work, the second positive
feedback loop is much stronger and faster than the first
one. But it can have very dangerous side-effects.
This blind social fascination is actually the autonomous
force, incorrectly attributed by social philosophy to tech-
nology proper, it is precisely the source of the Heideggerian
danger that “man will exalt himself and posture as the lord
of the earth”.
There are many examples of such blind social fascination.
Let us look only at an example of such danger well un-
derstood by software specialists, probably missed as yet by
philosophers of technology. Consider mobile telephony; the
current trend is to integrate many functions in the mobile
computer contained actually in any mobile (mobile tele-
phony device). One of such functions is global positioning
system (GPS); when it is integrated in a mobile, the posi-
tion on Earth of the user of the mobile can be determined
with great accuracy. This has obviously many advantages,
and users would pay for this function, mobile manufacturers
compete to improve this function, etc., a social fascination.
But what if an ambitious minister of interior uses this so-
cial fascination to “posture as the lord of the earth” and to
implement totalitarian control of people?
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For such reasons, it is clear that inputs from philosophy of
technology might enrich software development and evalu-
ation; the issue, how dangerous is too great accuracy of
pinpointing every user of a mobile, cannot be considered
as a purely technical or purely economic one, it might re-
quire special ethical discussion and legal safeguards. But
philosophers of technology, in order to be useful in such
a case, should know at which stage of technological devel-
opment they must participate.
Therefore, let us examine possible stages in some more
detail. We list these stages below:
1. Motivation – artistic urge or social demand.
2. Technology proper – actual construction or design of
a prototype tool.
3. Testing and evaluation.
4. Transfer from academia to industry.
5. Design of mass production process.
6. Pre-marketing: promotion of demand.
7. Mass production and marketing.
8. Re-engineering based on consumer (user) remarks.
9. Design of new versions due to technological advance-
ment and integration.
The list should not suggest that it is an almost linear7 pro-
cess, with few recursions. It is used only to shorten descrip-
tion, while in reality obviously there are many recursions,
at each stage different actors are usually involved, multi-
variate choices have to be made, etc. (see, e.g., [15]).
These nine points only outline the typical stages; some
might be omitted, some performed parallel. Stage 1 might
be just an idea of a novelty, which I call artistic urge;
or perception of future social demand; or realization of
actual economic demand, not quite satisfied by market
forces. Stage 2 is most important for technology creation
and, whether in hardware or software, is not reducible to
simple application of hard science; it is artistic, its main
motivation is the joy of creation (if an engineer wants to
make money, (s)he becomes a manager); this stage is most
misunderstood by social constructivists who do not even
notice its artistic motivation. Stage 3 is actually equally
important: since stages 1 and 2 might be artistic, intu-
itive, their products must be thoroughly tested and eval-
uated. Moreover, testing occurs recursively also in other
stages, e.g., after preparing a prototype for mass produc-
tion. In hardware, the tests are very often of destructive
character, such as crash tests of cars, just to determine the
limits of safe use of new tools. In software, we also often
abandon or re-engineer old versions after their tests and
evaluation.
Thus, technology is falsiﬁcationist (in the sense introduced
by Karl Popper, see [16]) in its everyday practice. If is
7“Linear” in the social science sense of being non-recursive; technolo-
gists would rather use “linear” in the sense of linearity of the mathematical
model.
a kind of irony, because postmodern sociology of science
ridicules falsificationism, saying (with some reasons) that
scientists do not try to disprove, only promote their theo-
ries; and Karl Popper defended his metaphysical position
with regard to the evolution of science, while regarding
technology as a mere application of science8. Meanwhile,
tools are not theories and it is technology that is actu-
ally falsificationist, because it is not a mere application
of science. This is consistent with (although not noted by)
Rachel Laudan [18], who tried to find scientific revolu-
tions of the type of Thomas Kuhn [19] in technology and
reported that technological revolutions have quite differ-
ent character, since technology is more pragmatic, less
paradigmatic.
Stage 4 is especially difficult and stages 2 and 3 might be
repeated in stage 4; we comment on the reasons in the next
section. Naturally, it happens that new technology prod-
ucts (not so often essentially new) are developed directly
in industrial laboratories; only then one can speak about
factory-like production of knowledge, a favourite theme of
postmodern sociology of science. But even then the con-
cept of techoscience [14] is a misnomer, because science is
paradigmatic, technology falsificationist, they differ essen-
tially in their values and episteme, and in industrial produc-
tion of knowledge there is a tension between them about the
intensity and character of testing and evaluation. Stages 5
and 7 are typical for industrial civilization, and stay im-
portant also during informational revolution, though natu-
rally change their character due to automation and roboti-
zation, and even more in the case of dematerialized soft-
ware products. Most of classical philosophy of technology
maintained that mass production – particularly Fordism –
is the defining characteristics of modern technology, often
without noting how information technology made classical
Fordism obsolete.
Stage 6 – promotion of demand – must start parallel with
preparation of mass production, because it might take more
time. Stages 8 and 9 – re-engineering and design of new
versions – often proceed parallel.
Now, when should a philosopher of technology participate
in this process, to make the outcomes more socially con-
trollable? This corresponds to the question of Langdon
Winner [15]: “Where should a philosopher go to learn
about technology?”9 I can accept the argument that it is
almost impossible for (her)him to participate in stages 1
and 2; but stage 3 starts relatively early, and the philoso-
pher of technology might be most useful then, also might
obtain important insights about the processes of technol-
ogy creation. Moreover, since (s)he is worried about social
8Ironically, Karl Popper actually argued that technology does not use
falsification [17]. However, his arguments were that engineers do not
abandon their designs after falsifying them (obviously not true) and that
technology does not use crucial experiments (also not true, much thought
is devoted in technology how to devise critical experiments). Thus, his
arguments show simply a lack of understanding of technology.
9My actual answer is: philosopher should learn technology as a part
of (her) his curriculum at university, since more than fifty years ago
I learned philosophy as a part of mine technological curriculum. But
above I propose a less demanding answer.
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consequences of technology, (s)he should take also an ac-
tive part in stage 6.
4. The Difference between Academic
and Industrial Knowledge Creation
In order to illustrate the difference of academic and in-
dustrial knowledge creation, I review here some results
concerning so-called micro-theories of knowledge creation.
The demands of knowledge based economy resulted re-
cently in the emergence of many such micro-theories –
concerning knowledge creation for the needs of today and
tomorrow, as opposed to classical concentration of philos-
ophy on macro-theories of knowledge creation on a long
term historical scale. Historically, we could count the con-
cept of brainstorming [20] as an early example of such
micro-theories. Since 1990 we observe many such new
micro-theories originating in systems science, management
science and information science, beginning with the Shi-
nayakana systems approach [21], the knowledge creat-
ing company and the SECI (socialization-externalization-
combination-internalization) spiral [22], the rational evo-
lutionary theory of intuition [23], the I 5 (pentagram) sys-
tem [24], the OPEC (objectives-process-expansion-closure)
spiral [25] and several others. All such recent micro-
theories of knowledge creation processes take into account
the interplay of tacit, intuitive, emotive, and preverbal as-
pects with explicit or rational aspects of knowledge cre-
ation, as well as the interplay between an individual and
a group.
Additional results concerning micro-theories of knowledge
creation were obtained also in the 21st Century COE Pro-
gram Technology Creation Based on Knowledge Science
at the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (JAIST). For example, the brainstorming process
was represented as the DCCV (divergence-convergence-
crystallization-verification) spiral [26] due to the research
in this program. The concept of creative space [4] tries to
provide a synthesis of such diverse micro-theories.
We shall not discuss here in detail the rational evolu-
tionary theory of powerful but fallible intuition (see [4],
[23], [27]). The introduction of a three-by three matrix
rational-intuitive-emotive and individual-group-humanity
knowledge used in [4] instead of two-by-two explicit-tacit
and individual-group used as the basis of the SECI spiral
in [22] makes it possible to generalize the SECI spiral into
a network-like model of creative processes, called creative
space (see Fig. 2).
The model of creative space consists of nodes – such as
Individual rationality or individual rational knowledge –
and transitions10 between the nodes — such as Internal-
ization from Individual rationality to Individual intuition.
Note that the SECI spiral of [22] is essentially preserved
10Originally called conversions by Nonaka and Takeuchi [22], but
knowledge is not lost when used, hence it cannot be converted; thus we
prefer the more neutral term transitions.
Fig. 2. Basic dimensions of creative space.
in the lower right-hand corner of Fig. 2; but creative space
involves also many other transitions. For example, the up-
per left-hand corner of Fig. 2 represents [28] the theory
of revolutionary scientific change in the form of the ARME
(abstraction-regress-mythologization-emphatization) spiral,
see [4] for a more detailed discussion.
Other dimensions can be added to the model of creative
space and many other knowledge creation processes can be
represented in the model. Knowledge management is natu-
rally more interested in the processes of normal knowledge
creation (as opposed to revolutionary; this distinction is
due to Kuhn [19]). In [5], two types of normal knowledge
creation processes are distinguished:
• Organizational or industrial processes in market or
purpose-oriented knowledge creation, such as the
SECI spiral of Nonaka and Takeuchi. Such processes
are motivated mostly by the interests of a group and
two other spirals of this type can be also represented
in creative space; these are the brainstorming DCCV
spiral [26] and the occidental counterpart of SECI
spiral, the OPEC spiral of [25].
• Academic processes of normal knowledge creation,
in universities and research institutes. Such processes
are motivated mostly by the interests of an individ-
ual researcher. Three typical spirals of this type are
distinguished as parts of creative space in [4]:
– the hermeneutic (enlightenment-analysis-her-
meneutic immersion-reflection) EAIR spiral of
reading and interpreting scientific literature;
– the debating EDIS (enlightenment-debate-im-
mersion-selection) spiral of scientific discus-
sions;
– the experimental EEIS (enlightenment-exper-
iment-interpretation-selection) spiral of per-
forming experiments and interpreting their re-
sults.
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We should note that all these three spirals begin with the
transition enlightenment from individual intuition to indi-
vidual rationality (called also variously abduction, aha, eu-
reka, illumination – simply having an idea – and indicated
in the bottom right-hand part of Fig. 2). Because of that, we
can switch between these three spirals or perform them par-
allel. This is indicated in Fig. 3, where these three spirals
are presented together as a triple helix of normal academic
knowledge creation.
Fig. 3. The triple helix of normal academic knowledge creation.
Thus, academic knowledge creation processes are quite
different than organizational knowledge creation; under-
standing their differences might help in overcoming the
difficulty of cooperation between academia and indus-
try. Alternatively, we could try to combine them, see
below.
These three spirals contained in the triple helix do not
exhaustively describe all what occurs in academic knowl-
edge creation, but they describe most essential elements
of academic research: gathering and interpreting informa-
tion and knowledge, debating and experimenting. In fact,
recent research including a questionnaire on creativity con-
ditions in JAIST supported, both directly and indirectly, the
conclusion that these elements are very important for aca-
demic knowledge creation, see [4], [29]. However, these
spirals are individually oriented, even if a university and
a laboratory should support them, e.g., the motivation for
and the actual research on preparing a doctoral thesis is
mostly individual. Moreover, the triple helix only describes
what researchers actually do, it is thus a descriptive model.
Obviously, the model helps in a better understanding of
some intuitive transitions in these spirals and makes pos-
sible testing, which parts of these spirals are well sup-
ported in academic practice and which require more sup-
port; but it does not give clear conclusions how to organize
research.
However, the three spirals of organizational knowledge cre-
ation mentioned before are important for practical knowl-
edge creation, for innovations, particularly in industry and
other purpose-oriented organizations. Unfortunately, they
cannot be easily combined into a multiple helix like the
triple helix, because they do not share the same elements.
The main challenge is not only to combine these spi-
rals between themselves, but also with the spirals of aca-
demic knowledge creation. This general challenge is diffi-
cult, but such a combination would be important for several
reasons:
– combining these spirals might strengthen academic
knowledge creation, because it would increase the
role of the group supporting the individual research;
– combining these spirals might strengthen also indus-
trial innovation and knowledge creation, because it
always contains also some individual elements that
should be explicitly accounted for;
– combining these spirals might help in the cooperation
of industry with academic institutions in producing
innovations, because it could bridge the gap between
the different ways of conducting research in academia
and in industry.
The idea of Nanatsudaki model of knowledge creation
processes [5] tries to derive pragmatic conclusions from
such analysis and synthesis, by combining seven spirals
(objective setting OPEC, hermeneutic EAIR, socializing
SECI, brainstorming DCCV, debating EDIS, roadmap-
ping I-System [30], and experimenting EEIS) in an or-
der useful for organizing large research projects, partic-
ularly for cooperation between academia and industry,
see Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Diagram of JAIST Nanatsudaki model (septagram of
creative spirals).
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The conclusion from this short discussion of the differ-
ences between academic and industrial knowledge creation
is clear: they are essentially different, both by the difference
between individual and group orientation and by the dif-
ferent character of typical processes used. We might try to
overcome these differences, both in praxis and by suggest-
ing models such as Nanatsudaki septagram, but overcoming
these differences causes additional delays in technology de-
velopment.
5. Changing Episteme
We understand here the concept of episteme in the sense
of [31] – as the way of creating and justifying knowledge
characteristic for a given historical era. However, if we
live in time of a change of historical eras, then we should
also observe a process of a change of the episteme. How
does such process proceed?
During last stages of a former era, a change of the episteme
is prepared by an accumulation of new concepts inconsis-
tent with the old episteme and a following destruction of
this old episteme. The new concepts inconsistent with the
modern episteme that accumulated during the 20th century
were, between others:
– relativity and relativism;
– indetermination and pluralism;
– feedback and dynamic systemic development;
– deterministic and probabilistic chaos, order emerging
out of chaos;
– butterfly effect and change;
– complexity and emergence principle;
– computational complexity as a limit on cognitive
power;
– logical pluralism;
– new theories of knowledge creation, etc.
This has led to a destruction of the modern episteme; in the
second half of the 20th century, such a destruction resulted
in a divergent development of the episteme of three cultural
spheres of:
– basic, hard and natural sciences;
– social sciences and humanities;
– technology.
Thus, we should speak not about two cultures [32], but
about three distinct episteme [11].
These cultural spheres adhere to different values, use differ-
ent concepts and languages, follow different paradigms or
underlying them hermeneutical horizons; such diﬀerences
increased gradually with the development of poststructural-
ism and postmodernism, while hard sciences and technol-
ogy went quite diﬀerent epistemic ways.
Obviously, technology cooperates strongly with hard and
natural sciences, as shown in Fig. 1; but there is an essen-
tial epistemic difference between these two spheres: hard
and natural sciences are paradigmatic, while technology is
not paradigmatic, rather pragmatic. However, both hard sci-
ences and technology know for a long time (e.g., since [33])
that knowledge is constructed by humans, only they inter-
pret this diversely.
Even if a hard scientist knows that all knowledge is con-
structed and there are no absolute truth and objectivity, he
believes that scientific theories are laws of nature discov-
ered by humans rather than models of knowledge created by
humans. He values truth and objectivity as ultimate ideals;
metaphorically, hard scientist resembles a priest.
A technologist is much more relativist and pragmatic in
his episteme, he readily agrees that scientiﬁc theories are
models of knowledge; but requires that these theories should
be as objective as possible, tested in practice, he de-
mands that they should be falsiﬁable (as postulated by Karl
Popper [16]). Metaphorically, a technologist resembles an
artist (see also [10]–[12]), also values tradition like an
artist does, much more than a scientist.
Without discussing in further detail the observed differ-
ences between the episteme of these three cultural spheres
and many actual examples of these epistemic differences –
science wars in the last decade of the 20th century were
a clear indication of them (see, e.g., [34]), we turn to other
conclusions.
If we are living in times of an informational revolution
and this revolution leads to a new civilization era, in which
knowledge plays an even more important role than just in-
formation – thus we might call the new epoch the knowl-
edge civilization era – then we might expect a formation of
a new, integrated episteme characteristic for the new era.
This usually occurs, as shown by Foucault [31], after the
beginning of the new era. Naturally, the dates of begin-
nings of historical eras are conventional, reflect a given
hermeneutical horizon, but are best defined by historians.
Thus we follow the example of Fernard Braudel [35] who
defined the long duration preindustrial era of the begin-
nings of capitalism, of print and geographic discoveries,
as starting in 1440 with Gutenberg, and ending in 1760
with Watt. Following his example, we select 1980 – the
time when information technology was made broadly so-
cially available by the introduction of personal computers
and computer networks – as the beginning date of the new
era of knowledge civilization, even though computers were
used earlier11.
11All these turning points were not new inventions, but improvements of
older inventions that enabled, however, their broad social use. Print was
known in China before Gutenberg, but it was inefficient, could not result
in a mass production of books. Steam engine was known before Watt, but
it tended to explode, could not be used broadly. Computers were known
before Apple Co. produced first personal computer, but former computers
were giant machines used only by specialists.
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Thus, instead of three waves of [36] we speak about recent
three civilization eras:
– preindustrial civilization (formation of capitalism)
1440–1760;
– industrial civilization 1760–1980;
– knowledge civilization 1980–2100+(?)
The date 2100+ means “at least until 2100” and is not only
a simple prediction based on shortening periods of these
eras (320–220–120?), it can be substantiated also differ-
ently, see [6].
The new episteme characteristic for the era of knowledge
civilization must be an integration of the diverged epistemic
positions of hard sciences, soft sciences and technology. An
attempt of such integration was made, e.g., in [5]. How-
ever, here we shall quote only some elements that might
help in the integration of the new episteme, namely, the
multimedia principle and the emergence principle. These
two principles were first formulated in [4], [5].
Multimedia principle: words are just an approximate code
to describe a much more complex reality, visual and pre-
verbal information in general is much more powerful and
relates to intuitive knowledge and reasoning; the future
records of the intellectual heritage of humanity will have
a multimedia character, thus stimulating creativity.
Emergence principle: new properties of a system emerge
with increased levels of complexity, and these properties are
qualitatively different than and irreducible to the properties
of its parts.
Both these principles might seem to be just common sense,
intuitive perceptions; the point is that they are justified ra-
tionally and scientifically. Moreover, they go beyond and
are in a sense opposed to fashionable trends in poststruc-
turalism and the postmodern philosophy or sociology of
science.
The multimedia principle is based on the technological and
information science knowledge: as shown in the rational
evolutionary theory of intuition [23], a ﬁgure is worth at
least ten thousand words. The poststructuralist philosophy
stresses the roles of metaphors and icons, but reduces them
to signs, which is contrary to the emergence principle.
Thus, the world is not constructed by us in a social dis-
course, as the poststructuralist and postmodern philosophy
wants us to believe: we observe the world by all our senses,
including vision, and strive to ﬁnd adequate words when
trying to describe our preverbal impressions and thinking
to communicate them in language. Language is a shortcut
in civilization evolution of humans, our original thinking is
preverbal, often unconscious.
Multimedia principle originates in technology and has
diverse implications for technology creation. Information
technology creation should concentrate on multimedia as-
pects of supporting communication and creativity. Technol-
ogy creation starts essentially with preverbal thinking.
The emergence principle is also partly motivated by techno-
logical experience. It stresses that new properties of a sys-
tem emerge with increased levels of complexity, and these
properties are qualitatively diﬀerent than and irreducible
to the properties of its parts. This might appear to be
just a conclusion from the classical concepts of systems
science, synergy and holism; or just a metaphysical reli-
gious belief. The point is that both such simplifying con-
clusions are mistaken. Synergy and holism say that a whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, but do not stress irre-
ducibility. Thus, according to classical systemic reasoning,
a whole is greater, but still explicable by and reducible to its
parts.
The best recent example of the phenomenon of emergence
is the concept of software that spontaneously emerged in
the civilization evolution during last fifty years. Software
cannot function without hardware, but is irreducible to and
cannot be explained by hardware. This has also some im-
portance for the metaphysics of the absolute, because it
is also a negation of the arguments of creationists who say
that irreducible complexity could not emerge spontaneously
in evolution.
Both multimedia principle and emergence principle might
be interpreted as having some metaphysical character, in
the same sense as Karl Popper admitted [16] that his fal-
sification principle has metaphysical character. The emer-
gence principle, however, is not a metaphysical religious be-
lief, because it can be justified rationally and scientifically
(see [4], [5]) – even if it might have serious metaphysical
consequences.
Based on the concepts presented above, we might turn
back to the issue of basic explanations of development of
science and technology. People, motivated by curiosity
and aided by intuition and emotions, formulate hypothe-
ses about properties of nature and of human relations; they
also construct tools that help them to deal with nature or
with other people; together, we call all this knowledge (see
also [37]). People test and evaluate the knowledge con-
structed by them by applying it to reality: perform destruc-
tive tests of tools, devise critical empirical tests of theories
concerning nature, apply and evaluate theories concerning
social and economic relations. Such a process can be rep-
resented as a general spiral of evolutionary knowledge cre-
ation [5], [34], see Fig. 5.
We observe reality and its changes, compare our observa-
tions with human intellectual heritage (Observation). Then
our intuitive and emotive knowledge helps us to generate
new knowledge (Enlightenment); we apply new knowledge
to existing reality (Application), obtain some changes of
reality (Modiﬁcation). We observe them again and mod-
ified reality becomes existing reality through Recourse;
only the positively tested knowledge, resilient to falsifica-
tion attempts, remains an important part of human heritage
(Evaluation); this can be interpreted as an objectifying,
stabilizing feedback.
Thus, nature is not only the eﬀect of construction of knowl-
edge by people, nor it is only the cause of knowledge: it
is both cause and eﬀect in a positive feedback loop, where
more knowledge results in more modiﬁcations of nature and
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Fig. 5. The general OEAM spiral of evolutionary knowledge
creation.
more modiﬁcations result in more knowledge. The overall
result is an avalanche-like growth of knowledge, although
it can have slower normal and faster revolutionary peri-
ods. This avalanche-like growth, if unchecked by stabi-
lizing feedbacks, beside tremendous opportunities creates
also diverse dangers, usually not immediately perceived but
lurking in the future.
Moreover, we should select knowledge that is as objec-
tive as possible (even if absolute objectivity is impossible;
which we know since Heisenberg [38]) because avalanche-
like growth creates diverse threats: we must leave to our
children best possible knowledge in order to prepare them
for dealing with unknown future.
6. What New Topics Can We List for
Philosophy of Technology
Science, particularly soft science, is paradigmatic; this con-
cerns also philosophy of technology, no matter whether
we would classify philosophy as science or as a separate
part of human knowledge. Philosophy of technology fol-
lows certain exemplars: it is general, sees technology as
a socio-economic system of producing and utilizing prod-
ucts of technology; sometimes accuses this system of be-
ing uncontrollable, or developing without taking into ac-
count humanistic values; or even being unethical; is his-
torically oriented, concentrates on ex post evaluation of
results of technological development – and avoids learning
details of technological development. This concerns even
the most technology-friendly, new approaches to philoso-
phy of technology, such as Don Ihde [39] or Peter-Paul
Verbeek [40].
We have seen that this paradigm is self-reinforcing: if you
don’t want to learn details of a process and the process has
internal, large delays, then you will consider this process
uncontrollable; if you judge that some process is uncon-
trollable, then you do not think it is worth learning its’
details. We have seen that this paradigm is just opposite to
the praxis of software development and evaluation which –
despite inevitable delays – concentrates practically on the
control of an important technological process.
Therefore, a way of changing the paradigmatic attitude of
philosophy of technology is to invite some such philoso-
phers to participate in software development and evaluation;
if they want to have an impact on contemporary technol-
ogy development, to a large extent determined by software,
it is an invitation they could not refuse without risking
becoming outdated and sterile. And they can enrich soft-
ware evaluation, contribute to its’ ethical and sociological
dimensions.
However, when participating in software evaluation,
philosophers of technology will inevitably learn more about
software, about its evaluation methods, about the falsifica-
tionist approach of technology to knowledge creation – thus
they will be forced to revise their paradigm. Thus, invit-
ing philosophers to participate in software evaluation is not
only in the interest of the latter; it is also in the interest of
better understanding the character of informational revolu-
tion and knowledge civilization era.
If the philosophers of technology learn more about infor-
mational revolution, they might be also helpful in resolving
new conflicts and counteracting new dangers related to the
knowledge civilization era. We shall discuss here shortly
only two such issues.
First is the conﬂict between the individual property of
knowledge, supported by public property of the human in-
tellectual heritage, and the corporate property of knowledge
that attempts to subjugate the individual knowledge of em-
ployees and to privatise the human intellectual heritage.
This conflict is inevitable if knowledge becomes the main
productive resource. Old arguments supporting privatiza-
tion (e.g., so called tragedy of commons: common use of
a pasture leads to a degradation of the common resource)
are used to justify the actions of the corporate side, but
knowledge has different properties than other productive
resources, it is not degradable, its use results in an in-
crease, not a decrease of the jointly held knowledge. Thus,
it is better for society if knowledge remains public resource,
while many corporate companies realized long ago that it
is in their interest to privatize this public property. This
conflict is already perceived, see [41], and academy strikes
back by promoting the idea of open access and demand-
ing that all results of research financed by public resources
should be freely accessible in net portals. However, this
is only the beginning of a conflict that might become the
defining one for the knowledge civilization era.
The second is an actual threat of computer and robot dom-
ination of people. Such a threat was a natural subject of
science fiction; on the other hand, some excellent books,
e.g., [42], have shown that human mind cannot be dupli-
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cated by a classical computer intelligence. However, while
the rational evolutionary theory of intuition [23] supports
such a conclusion, it also shows that the difference, al-
though tremendous, is quantitative (e.g., a figure is worth
at least ten thousand words). Thus, if the Moore law [43]
holds for another two or three decades, new aspects of the
intelligence of computers might emerge and it might start
to be comparable even to the intuitive and emotive intelli-
gence of humans. Moreover, already now robots are being
used as weapons; what about their use by terrorists or or-
ganized crime? Thus, we should not regard this issue as
a distant, science fiction question, but already now start
debates how to counteract these dangers.
7. Conclusions
The main points of this paper are:
• Technology development process is complex, has
many stages and includes many delays, in historical
evidence amounting sometimes to fifty years.
• When seen holistically from outside, such a process is
apt to appear uncontrollable (called also autonomous
or deterministic by philosophy of technology) – but
this is only a matter of perspective.
• When seen from inside and in technological detail,
such a process is very much controllable, and several
technological disciplines concentrate on the ways of
controlling such processes.
• Software development and evaluation is one of such
processes, very important for future technology de-
velopment.
• It is worthwhile to invite philosophers of technology
to participate in software evaluation; this might even
contribute to the change of the paradigm of philoso-
phy of technology.
• Philosophy of technology should be also aware of
new conflicts and dangers related to the knowledge
civilization era.
A general conclusion is also that we need paradigm changes
and essentially new approaches to many issues, such as
software development and evaluation versus philosophy of
technology, in the time when informational revolution re-
sults in a transition towards knowledge civilization.
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